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CONFIDENCE IN PROBABILITY: BURDENS OF
PERSUASION IN A WORLD OF IMPERFECT
KNOWLEDGE
NEIL B. COHEN*
Commentators and courts have debated with considerable difficulty the correct proba-
bilistic approach to burdens of persuasion. In this Article, Professor Cohen explains
why he believes past efforts have failed. He then advances his own probabilistic model
of the proof process, relying largely upon the statistical concept of "confidence inter-
vals. " Finally, Professor Cohen applies his model to the preponderance of the evidence
standard and points out the model's implications for more stringent standards.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, scholars have hotly debated the role of probabilistic
judgments in the legal process. For example, they have employed
probability theory to explain and define the concept of relevance1 and to
analyze reapportionment of voting districts.2 It is the role of probability
in legal proof, however, that has generated the most interest and
controversy. 3
Although there are those who strongly advocate the use of probabil-
istic methods in the proof process, others express doubt about the appli-
cability of traditional probability rules to the determination of facts at
issue in a trial.4 Moreover, the proponents of applying probability theory
to legal issues have been unable to articulate clearly the connections
among available data, probability calculus, and decisions about liability
or guilt.5 In particular, the current probabilistic models of burdens of
persuasion suggest that the preponderance of the evidence standard is
met in some important situations in which the legal system traditionally
would deny that it is.6 A close examination reveals that some of these
* Professor of Law, Seton Hall University; Visiting Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law
School. S.B., 1974, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; J.D., 1977, New York University.
The author would like to acknowledge the contributions made by his colleagues Catherine
McCauliff, D. Michael Risinger, Charles A. Sullivan, and Michael Zimmer, all of whom pro-
vided helpful criticisms of various drafts of this Article, and by his research assistant, Eileen
Mitchell of the Seton Hall University School of Law Class of 1985, whose assistance in all
phases of preparation in this Article was exceptional.
I See, e.g., R. Eggleston, Evidence, Proof and Probability 79-87 (2d ed. 1983).
2 See, e.g., M. Finkelstein, Quantitative Methods in Law 105-30 (1978).
3 See text accompanying notes 10-33 infra.
4 See text accompanying notes 39-41, 47-52 infra.
5 See text accompanying notes 67-73 infra.
6 See text accompanying notes 63-68 infra.
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models incorporate a misunderstanding of the nature of the probabilities
determined within the legal system.
This Article provides a more theoretically accurate view of these
probabilities and proposes an alternative model of their relation to legal
proof. Part I summarizes the development of the application of
probability theory to legal facts. It sets out the currently accepted proba-
bilistic formulation of the burdens of persuasion and, in particular, of the
preponderance of the evidence standard in civil litigation. It then shows
how this formulation results in verdicts that are inconsistent with those
that actually occur in the legal system and explains why the proffered
explanations for the contradictions are inadequate. Part II identifies the
incorrect assumptions about forensic probabilities made by the current
models and suggests a more theoretically accurate method of analyzing
them. It then applies this analysis to construct a more realistic probabil-
istic formulation of the preponderance of the evidence burden of persua-
sion. Part III notes implications of the new model for related problems
in the proof process.
I
THE CURRENT MODEL
A. Historical Development
The process of proving facts in a legal context virtually always in-
volves at least an implicit appeal to the factfinder's intuitive assessment
of probabilities. It is not surprising, therefore, that some of the seminal
probability theorists-Leibniz in the seventeenth century, Bernoulli in
the eighteenth century, and Boole in the nineteenth century7-suggested
the application of probability calculus in a legal setting. As Professor L.
Jonathan Cohen has pointed out, "Leibniz and Bernoulli sought to de-
velop a theory of probability that would have among its principal goals
the provision of an adequate analysis for gradations of legal proof."8
Although probability theory has flourished for many years as an in-
dependent intellectual discipline, scholarly interest in its application
within the legal system languished until the latter half of this century.
Until relatively recently, the application of probability theory to the law
of proof, with some notable exceptions, scarcely had advanced beyond
7 See G. Leibniz, Aligemeine Untersuchungen Uber Die Analyse Der Begriffe und
Wahren Satze (1686); J. Bernoulli, Ars Conjectandi (1741); Boole, On the Application of the
Theory of Probabilities to the Question of the Combination of Testimonies on Judgments, 21
Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh 597 (1857); see also L. Cohen, The Probable
and the Provable 2, 44, 52 (1977).
8 L. Cohen, supra note 7, at 2.
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Boole's work in the nineteenth century. 9
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,10 which prohibits employ-
ment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin," opened the door to the use of overtly probabilistic and statistical
evidence in litigation. Whereas it is easy to win a lawsuit against an em-
ployer who explicitly refuses to hire members of one of the protected
classes for particular positions, most discrimination is not so blatant.
Typically an employer will simply underselect members of the disfavored
class without admitting or exhibiting any discriminatory intent. Title
VII plaintiffs, therefore, generally must prove their cases through cir-
cumstantial evidence.1 2 The most common (and often the only) evidence
in these cases consists of empirical data about the available labor pool
and the work force.1 3 Such data, when analyzed through accepted statis-
tical techniques, can provide a reliable basis for drawing inferences about
discrimination in the hiring process.14 Indeed, the Supreme Court has
held that empirical evidence from which such statistical inferences can be
drawn is sufficient to constitute a prima facie case of illegal discrimina-
tion.15 Therefore, it is important to recognize the effect of Title VII on
the development of probability theory in the legal process. Title VII,
along with other antidiscrimination statutes such as the Equal Pay Act of
196316 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965,17 provided a powerful incen-
tive for the legal world to develop a greater understanding of the basic
principles of probability and statistics. The academic world quickly re-
9 These exceptions include Ball, The Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and Stan-
dards of Proof, 14 Vand. L. Rev. 807 (1961); Cowan, Decision Theory in Law, Science, and
Technology, 17 Rutgers L. Rev. 499 (1963); James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29
Calif. L. Rev. 689 (1941); MeBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 Calif. L. Rev. 242
(1944); Michael & Adler, The Trial of an Issue of Fact (pts. 1-2), 34 Colum. L. Rev. 1224,
1462 (1934).
10 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982).
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
12 See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-07 (1973); Reyes v.
Hoffman, 580 F.2d 393, 394-95 (10th Cir. 1978); Calcote v. Texas Educ. Found., 578 F.2d 95,
96-97 (5th Cir. 1978). See generally D. Baldus & J. Cole, Statistical Proof of Discrimination
§ 1.23, at 44-50 (1980); B. Schlei & P. Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 1286-1394
(2d ed. 1983).
13 B. Schlei & P. Grossman, supra note 12, at 156; C. Sullivan, M. Zimmer & R. Richards,
Federal Statutory Law of Employment Discrimination 16 (1980).
14 D. Baldus & J. Cole, supra note 12, § 0.1, at 4-5. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Team-
sters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339-40 n.20 (1977).
Is See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977); Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 (1971); see also Lehman v. Trout, 465 U.S. 1056, 1058
(1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
339 (1977) (dictum); Movement for Opportunity & Equality v. General Motors Corp., 622
F.2d 1235, 1258 (7th Cir. 1980).
16 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982).
17 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-1973bb(a) (1982 & Supp. I 1983).
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sponded not only with a variety of scholarly analyses of statistical and
probablistic issues involved in the proof of discrimination,1 8 but also with
a resurgence of interest in more basic issues regarding the relationship
between probability and proof.19
The notorious criminal prosecution in the case of People v. Collins20
further stimulated this renewed scholarly interest. In Collins, witnesses
testified to having seen two individuals-a blond woman with a ponytail
and a black man with a beard and mustache-flee together from the
scene in a yellow car immediately following a bank robbery.2 The pros-
ecution attempted to use probability theory to establish that the defen-
dants-a blond woman who had frequently worn a ponytail and a black
man who had previously worn a beard and mustache and who drove a
yellow car 22-were the same individuals that the witnesses saw near the
scene of the crime. The state called as an expert witness an instructor of
mathematics at a state college who testified as to the "product rule,"
which states, in one form, that the probability that a number of mutually
independent events will all occur together is equal to the product of the
separate probabilities that each event will occur.2 3 The prosecutor then
18 See, e.g., Baldus & Cole, Quantitative Proof of Intentional Discrimination, 1 Evaluation
Q. 53 (1977); Bogen & Falcon, The Use of Racial Statistics in Fair Housing Cases, 34 Md. L.
Rev. 59 (1974); Braun, Statistics and the Law: Hypothesis Testing and Its Application to Title
VII Cases, 32 Hastings L.J. 59 (1980); Cohn, On the Use of Statistics in Employment Discrim-
ination Cases, 55 Ind. L.J. 493 (1980); Dawson, Are Statisticians Being Fair to Employment
Discrimination Plaintiffs?, 21 Jurimetrics J. 1 (1980); Feinberg, The Increasing Sophistication
of Statistical Assessments as Evidence in Discrimination Litigation, 77 J. Am. Statistical A.
784 (1982); Finkelstein, The Application of Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury Discrimi-
nation Cases, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 338 (1966); Finkelstein, The Judicial Reception of Multiple
Regression Studies in Race and Sex Discrimination Cases, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 737 (1980),
Grady, Statistics in Employment Discrimination, 30 Lab. L.J. 748 (1979); Hallock, The Num-
bers Game-The Use and Misuse of Statistics in Civil Rights Litigation, 23 Viii. L. Rev. 5
(1977); Hay, The Use of Statistics to Disprove Employment Discrimination, 29 Lab. L.J. 430
(1978); Kaye, Statistical Evidence of Discrimination, 77 J. Am. Statistical A. 773 (1982); Mon-
tlack, Using Statistical Evidence to Enforce the Laws Against Discrimination, 22 Clev. St. L.
Rev. 259 (1973); Shoben, Differential Pass-Fail Rates in Employment Testing: Statistical
Proof Under Title VII, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 793 (1978); Shoben, In Defense of Disparate Impact
Analysis Under Title VII: A Reply to Dr. Cohn, 55 Ind. L.J. 515 (1980); Note, Beyond the
Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrimination Law: Statistical Proof and Rebuttal, 89
Harv. L. Rev. 387 (1975); Comment, Judicial Refinement of Statistical Evidence in Title VII
Cases, 13 Conn. L. Rev. 515 (1981); Comment, Statistics and Title VII Proof: Prima Facie
Case and Rebuttal, 15 Hous. L. Rev. 1030 (1978); Kaye, The Numbers Game: Statistical
Inference in Discrimination Cases (Book Review), 80 Mich. L. Rev. 833 (1982).
19 See, e.g., Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 1065
(1968); Lozowick, Steiner & Miller, Law and Quantitative Multivariate Analysis: An En-
counter, 66 Mich. L. Rev. 1641 (1968); Zeisel, Statistics as Legal Evidence, 15 Int'l Encyclope-
dia Soc. Sci. 246 (D. Sills ed. 1968).
20 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968).
21 Id. at 321, 438 P.2d at 34, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
22 Id. at 322-23, 438 P.2d at 34-35, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 498-99.
23 Id. at 325, 438 P.2d at 36-37, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
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invented hypothetical frequencies with which the characteristics that wit-
nesses had ascribed to the individuals seen leaving the scene of the crime
could be expected to occur in the general population,24 and multiplied
these unverified frequencies together to conclude that the probability that
a randomly chosen couple would share the distinctive characteristics of
the robbers was one in twelve million. 2 - Not surprisingly, the defen-
dants, who possessed all of the characteristics, were convicted. 26
The Supreme Court of California reversed the convictions, holding
that the mathematical testimony was inadmissible and that its admission
was sufficiently prejudicial to constitute grounds for reversal. 27 The
court found the mathematical testimony inadmissible on four grounds.
First, the prosecution had supplied no empirical evidence to support the
accuracy of the frequencies upon which it based its probability calcula-
tion.28 Second, the product rule in the form used by the prosecution
applies only when each factor considered in the equation is independent
of all the others-a condition that had not been met in this case.29 Third,
the resulting probability-one in twelve million-assumed that all testi-
mony as to the characteristics of the robbers was accurate-a highly ten-
uous assumption given the uncertain nature of eyewitness testimony.30
Fourth, the mathematician had calculated the likelihood that a random
couple would possess the combination of characteristics in question-a
concept that is quite different from the likelihood that an actual couple
possessing those characteristics is innocent.31
Although prosecutors in earlier cases had attempted to use the prod-
uct rule to demonstrate that an accused had committed a crime,32 the
24 Id. at 325, 438 P.2d at 36-37, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 500-01.
25 Id. at 325, 438 P.2d at 37, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 501. The prosecutor thereby implied that
there was only one chance in twelve million that defendants were innocent and another couple
with the same characteristics committed the crime.
26 Id. at 320-21, 438 P.2d at 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 497.
27 Id. at 332-33, 438 P.2d at 41-42, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 505-06.
28 Id. at 327-28, 438 P.2d at 38-39, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 502-03. The prosecutor fabricated the
figures and then asked the mathematician to calculate the product. The prosecutor then postu-
lated that the product accurately demonstrated that there was one chance in twelve million
that the defendants were innocent and another couple with the same characteristics committed
the crime. Indeed, the prosecutor even speculated that his hypothetical figures were conserva-
tive and that, as a result, the actual likelihood was much less.
29 Id. at 328-29, 438 P.2d at 39, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 503. For characteristics to be independent
of each other, it is necessary that the occurrence of one does not affect the likelihood of any of
the others. The court noted that several of the supposedly "independent" variables-such as
"Negroes with beards" and "men with mustaches"-obviously represent overlapping catego-
ries that are positively correlated with each other.
30 Id. at 330-31, 438 P.2d at 40, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
31 Id. at 331, 438 P.2d at 40-41, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 504-05. The court estimated that the
actual probability of guilt was closer to 40%. See id. at 333-35, 438 P.2d at 42-43, 66 Cal.
Rptr. at 506-07.
32 See, e.g., State v. Sneed, 76 N.M. 349, 352-53, 414 P.2d 858, 860-61 (1966); People v.
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abuse of probability theory in Collins inspired a large number of scholars
to reflect and comment upon the relationship between probability and
proof.
3 3
B. Current Theory
Today there exists a significant body of literature advocating the ap-
plication of probability theory to the proof process.34 Despite conceptual
and analytic diversity within the literature, there is general agreement on
two fundamental points. First, probabilistic techniques may be used to
determine the likelihood of the facts supporting a defendant's guilt or
liability.35 Second, the plaintiff's or prosecutor's burden is satisfied when
Risley, 214 N.Y. 75, 83-85, 108 N.E. 200, 202-03 (1915). Cf. The Howland Will Case, dis-
cussed in 4 Am. L. Rev. 625, 648-49 (1870).
33 See, e.g., Broun & Kelly, Playing the Percentages and the Law of Evidence, 1970 U. Ill.
L.F. 23; Callen, Notes on a Grand Illusion: Some Limits on the Use of Bayesian Theory in
Evidence Law, 57 Ind. L.J. 1 (1982); Charrow & Smith, A Conversation About "A Conversa-
tion About Collins," 64 Geo. L.J. 669 (1976); Cohen, The Logic of Proof, 1980 Crim. L. Rev.
91; Cohen, Selective Probability and the Paradox of the Gatecrasher, 1981 Ariz. St. L.i 627;
Cullison, Identification by Probabilities and Trial by Arithmetic (A Lesson For Beginners in
How To Be Wrong with Greater Precision), 6 Hous. L. Rev. 471 (1969); Cullison, Probability
Analysis of Judicial Fact-Finding: A Preliminary Outline of the Subjective Approach, I U.
Tol. L. Rev. 538 (1969); Fairley & Mosteller, A Conversation About Collins, 41 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 242 (1974); Feinberg, Teaching the Type I and Type II Errors: The Judicial Process,
Am. Statistician, June 1971, at 30; Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence
Standard: Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation, 1982 Am. B. Found.
Research J. 487 [hereinafter Kaye, Naked Statistical Evidence]; Kaye, The Paradox of the
Gatecrasher and Other Stories, 1979 Ariz. St. L.J. 101 [hereinafter Kaye, The Paradox of the
Gatecrashers]; Kaye, Paradoxes, Gedanken Experiments and the Burden of Proof: A Re-
sponse to Dr. Cohen's Reply, 1981 Ariz. St. L.J. 635; Kornstein, A Bayesian Model of Harm-
less Error, 5 J. Legal Stud. 121 (1976); Large & Michie, Proving that the Strength of the
British Navy Depends on the Number of Old Maids in England: A Comparison of Scientific
Proof with Legal Proof, 11 Envtl. L. 555 (1981); Little, Mathematical and Statistical
Probability as a Test of Circumstantial Evidence, 19 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 254 (1968); Meier &
Zabell, Benjamin Pierce and the Howland Will, 75 J. Am. Statistical A. 497 (1980); Milanich,
Decision Theory and Standards of Proof, 5 L. & Hum. Behav. 87 (1981); Orloff& Stedinger, A
Framework for Evaluating the Preponderance-of-the-Evidence Standard, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1159 (1983); Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with Statistical In-
ference and Individualized Judgment, 88 Yale L.J. 1408 (1979); Williams, The Mathematics of
Proof-I, 1979 Crim. L. Rev. 297 [hereinafter Williams, The Mathematics of Proof]; Williams,
A Short Rejoinder, 1980 Crim. L. Rev. 103; Comment, Mathematical Models of Legal Rules:
Application, Exploitation and Interpretation, 13 Conn. L. Rev. 33 (1980); Comment,
Probability Theory and Constructive Possession of Narcotics: On Finding That Winning
Combination, 17 Hous. L. Rev. 541 (1980); Comment, Admissibility of Probability Statistics
in a Criminal Trial: People v. Collins, 48 Or. L. Rev. 281 (1969); Kaye, Book Review, 89 Yale
L.J. 601 (1980) [hereinafter Kaye, Book Review].
34 See, e.g., R. Eggleston, supra note 1; M. Finkelstein, supra note 2; Brook, Inevitable
Errors: The Preponderance of the Evidence Standard in Civil Litigation, 18 Tulsa L.J. 79
(1982); Kaplan, supra note 19; Kaye, Naked Statistical Evidence, supra note 33.
35 Much of the work in this area employs Bayes' Theorem to determine probablities.
Bayes' Theorem, derived in the eighteenth century by the Reverend Thomas Bayes, allows an
initial probability determination to be adjusted to take into account new information. See
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that probability exceeds a threshold value.36
Although these probabilistic techniques are standard, their applica-
tion to the determination of legal facts is not straightforward. In tradi-
tional probability theory, the probability of a given outcome in some
activity is calculated by observing the frequency with which that out-
come occurs; the probability value represents the fraction of times that
the particular outcome would be expected to occur in a very large or
infinite number of repeated trials of the activity.37 For example, if the
number 3 were to turn up on 5000 out of 30,000 throws of a die, the
probability of throwing a "3" would be assigned a value of 5000/30,000,
or 1/6.
This view of probability-based upon numerous repetitions of the
same event-is not directly applicable in determining the likelihood of
disputed facts in a legal setting. For example, in the case of a defendant
who is being tried for the robbery of a particular bank on a particular
date, it would not make sense to discuss the probability that the defen-
dant robbed the bank if by "probability" we really meant "the fraction of
all occasions in which this exact evidence was adduced that the defen-
dant actually did rob the bank." The event occurred only once, the fact
pattern is unique, and the defendant either robbed the bank or did not
rob the bank.
Nonetheless, there is a natural tendency to think in terms of the
"probability" that a unique event has occurred. One who did not know
that the term "probability" had been reserved, at least formally, for the
concept of relative frequency would probably be surprised to learn that
the term could not be used to describe the likelihood that a unique event
has occurred.
Theory eventually caught up with intuition, and by the 1950's
probability estimates of unique events had been incorporated into
probability theory. Leonard J. Savage convincingly demonstrated that
such estimates, known as "subjective" or "personalist" probabilities,
obey all the rules of frequency probabilities, and argued that, as a result,
probability calculus could be used to help establish the likelihood of
unique events such as those in dispute in a legal setting.38
By the mid-1970's, however, an articulate backlash had developed.
Bayes, An Essay Towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances (1763). See also T.
Wonnacott & R. Wonnacott, Introductory Statistics for Business and Economics § 19-1, at
539-43 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter Wonnacott & Wonnacott].
36 See generally Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion
in Criminal Cases, 86 Yale L.J. 1299 (1977). See also United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp.
388, 403-11 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073
(1980).
37 Wonnacott & Wonnacott, supra note 35, § 3-1.
38 L. Savage, The Foundations of Statistics (Ist ed. 1954).
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This movement was led by the British philosopher L. Jonathan Cohen 39
and American law professors Lea Brilmayer and Lewis Kornhauser,
40
who expressed doubt as to the underlying validity of subjective
probability calculus, and, therefore, as to the validity of assigning
probability values to the unique facts at issue in legal cases.4! Other
scholars, including Glanville Williams,42 David Kaye,43 and Richard Eg-
gleston,44 have rebutted these arguments and have bolstered those sup-
porting the use of subjective probabilities in legal analysis. Today,
although the debate as to the validity of the application of subjective
probability theory to legal proof is not closed,45 numerous commentators
acknowledge the value of probabilistic interpretation of factual issues in-
volved in a legal dispute.46 Rather than review and amplify the argu-
ments of that debate, this Article proceeds upon the assumption that
probability theory has a legitimate application to problems of legal proof.
Although the views of Cohen, Brilmayer, and Kornhauser have not
prevailed, the reservations of another scholar, Laurence Tribe,47 have
had a significant impact. Professor Tribe does not question the theoreti-
cal validity of probability calculus in the factfinding process; indeed, he
accepts Professor Savage's observation that subjective probabilities obey
39 See L. Cohen, supra note 7. Cohen finds that "[p]aradox after paradox emerges from any
sufficiently thoroughgoing attempt to represent the logic of legal proof in terms of the calculus
of chance." Id. at 2. After examining these anomalies, he concludes that "the mathematicist
analysis. . . does not fit the assessment of judicial proof according to existing legal standards
and procedures." Id. at 118.
40 Brilmayer & Kornhauser, Quantitative Methods and Legal Decisions (Book Review), 46
U. Chi. L. Rev. 116, 135-48 (1978). The authors criticize the use of Bayesian analysis in legal
settings because the theorem does not account for the weight of the evidence, the process of
combining issues within the same case, or the concept of the sufficiency of evidence. Id. They
conclude that, "[s]ince legal problems are subtle and complex, the unquantifiable variables
may well dwarf the quantifiable ones and make numerical modeling futile." Id. at 152-53.
41 See also G. Shafer, A Mathematical Theory of Evidence (1976). Shafer rejects the
Bayesian notion that degrees of belief follow the rules of chance. He criticises Bayesian per-
sonalists because they "do not seek to analyze the relation between an individual's degrees of
belief and his evidence. Nor do they seek to relate the structure of those degrees of belief to the
nature of evidence. Instead, they set themselves the task of finding conditions that a set of
degrees of belief must obey in order to be internally consistent." Id. at 21.
42 See Williams, The Mathematics of Proof, supra note 33.
43 See Kaye, The Laws of Probability and the Law of the Land, 47 U. Chi. L. Rev. 34
(1979).
44 See R. Eggleston, supra note 1, at 30-49.
45 See, e.g., Nesson, The Evidence or the Event?, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1357, 1359 (1985)
(arguing that "[t]he aim of the factfinding process is not to generate mathematically 'probable'
verdicts, but rather to generate acceptable ones [that] will project the underlying legal rule to
society and affirm the rule's behaviorial norm").
46 See note 34 supra.
47 Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 Harv. L.
Rev. 1329 (1971) [hereinafter Tribe, Trial by Mathematics]; see also Tribe, A Further Critique
of Mathematical Proof, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1810 (1971).
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the principles of objective frequencies.48 Rather, Tribe argues that "the
costs of attempting to integrate mathematics into the factfinding process
of a legal trial outweigh the benefits."'49 In particular, Tribe asserts that
the explicit use of probabilistic methods often will result in inaccurate
and distorted outcomes.5 0 Furthermore, he argues that even if more reli-
able outcomes were produced, such use could undermine values more
important to our legal system than those favoring accuracy of
factfinding.51
Although several commentators have accepted Tribe's thesis,52
many others continue to advocate the use of probabilistic methods in the
legal process.5 3 Even if one accepts Tribe's unverified cost-benefit analy-
sis, 54 however, it is critical to note that his criticism is directed at the
explicit integration of probabilistic methods into the trial process. He
does not directly attack the underlying theoretical validity of applying
probability theory to problems of legal proof.
As noted above,55 the second factor in common among those who
advocate the application of probabilistic methods to legal proof is the
derivation of a probabilistic formulation of the burden of persuasion, re-
quiring that the defendant be found guilty or liable when the probability
of the facts supporting guilt or liability exceeds a particular threshold
value.5 6 With respect to criminal prosecutions, for which the burden of
persuasion is defined as "beyond a reasonable doubt, '57 courts and com-
mentators do not agree as to the probability of guilt sufficient to convict a
defendant 58 or even whether a particular probability value can or should
48 Tribe, Trial by Mathematics, supra note 47, at 1346-49.
49 Id. at 1377.
50 Id. at 1358-68.
51 Id. at 1368-77. Tribe identifies three key values in the criminal setting-the presump-
tion of innocence, the notion of innocence until proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and
public faith in the humanity of the legal system-that are threatened by the introduction of
probabilistic methods into the factfinding process. Id. These concerns are shared by others.
See, e.g., Nesson, supra note 45.
52 See, e.g., Kellman, Anxiety over the TMI Accident: An Essay on NEPA's Limits of
Inquiry, 51 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 219, 234 n.104 (1983); Orloff & Stedinger, supra note 33, at
1162 n.11 (1983); Scobogin, Dangerous Expertise, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 97, 124 n.104 (1984);
Note, Rules for an Exceptional Class: The Commitment and Release of Persons Acquitted of
Violent Crimes by Reason of Insanity, 57 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 281, 313 n.153 (1982); Note, The
Inapplicability of Traditional Tort Analysis to Environmental Risks: The Example of Toxic
Waste Pollution Victim Compensation, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 575, 584 n.35 (1983).
53 See, e.g., commentaries cited in note 34 supra.
54 This author believes that Tribe's analysis is flawed, especially with respect to civil mat-
ters. However, elaboration of this point must await a subsequent article.
55 See text accompanying note 36 supra.
56 See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 19, at 1071-77.
57 See C. McCormick, Evidence § 344, at 962-64 (3d ed. 1984); 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence
§ 2497, at 404-15 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1981).
58 See, e.g., United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 403-11 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), afl'd, 603
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
June 1985]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
be chosen at all.59
Proponents of probabilistic decisionmaking generally agree, how-
ever, that the preponderance of the evidence standard employed in civil
litigation, commonly defined as the burden of demonstrating that the
likelihood of the defendant's liability is greater than the likelihood of his
innocence,60 is satisfied by demonstrating that the probability of the
existence of the facts supporting liability exceeds 0.5.61 This standard
seems to comport with common sense, and, in fact, a probability of 0.5
has been demonstrated to be the optimal decision point for civil cases, in
which "the consequences of an error in one direction are just as serious
as the consequences of an error in the other."
62
In sum, current models applying probabilistic analysis to the proof
process share two components: the probability of the event in question is
determined by the factfinder, and this probability is then compared with
a fixed standard. These models thus share an implicit assumption-that
the legal system can and does determine exact probabilities of the facts at
issue. This assumption is, however, unwarranted and analytically un-
founded. Part II of this Article explores the difficulties associated with
this assumption, identifies a more accurate method of describing the abil-
ity to assign probability values in the legal system, and formulates a prob-
abilistic definition of the burden of persuasion in civil cases that takes
these considerations into account.
II
TOWARD A BETTER THEORY
A. Theoretical Problems with the Current Model
In criticizing the application of probability theory to legal proof,
Professors Cohen and Tribe identify situations in which the probabilistic
F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980) (discussing quantified estimates of
burdens of proof in the criminal context); United States v. Schipani, 289 F. Supp. 43
(E.D.N.Y. 1968), aft'd, 414 F.2d 1262 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970) (dis-
cussing the quantification of the preponderance of the evidence standard); Kaplan, supra note
19, at 1073-77 (discussing situations in which different probabilities might suffice to sustain a
conviction). See also McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or
Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 Vand. L. Rev. 1293, 1325 (1982) (author survey showing diver-
gence of opinion among 171 judges concerning the probability of guilt that should suffice to
sustain a conviction).
59 See Tribe, Trial by Mathematics, supra note 47, at 1372-73 (arguing that the criminal
justice system should avoid imposing sanctions in the face of a quantitatively measured doubt).
60 See C. McCormick, supra note 57, § 339, at 956-59.
61 See, e.g., id.; Kaye, Naked Statistical Evidence, supra note 33, at 493; Kaye, Book Re-
view, supra note 33, at 609; Williams, The Mathematics of Proof, supra note 33, at 297; Win-
ter, The Jury and the Risk of Nonpersuasion, 5 Law & Soc. Rev. 335, 336-39 (1971).
62 Kaplan, supra note 19, at 1072.
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model suggests verdicts inconsistent with current, arguably correct, judi-
cial practice. Professor Cohen presents an example involving a rodeo at
which, of 1,000 people in attendance, it is known and uncontested that
only 499 paid the admission price-the rest are gatecrashers. 63 Further-
more, there is no objective way to distinguish the gatecrashers from the
paying customers. Cohen observes that if the rodeo proprietor brought
suit for the admission charge against any particular spectator at the ro-
deo when the only evidence put to the factfinders was the total atten-
dance and the number in attendance who had paid, the probabilistic
model requires that the proprietor recover against each, and presumably
against all, of those in attendance because for each case the probability
that the defendant is a gatecrasher is equal to 0.501 (which is, of course,
greater than 0.5).64
Similarly, Tribe posits the case of a tort plaintiff who has been run
down by an unidentified blue bus.65 Tribe suggests that if there is no
evidence concerning the identity of the bus owner except that the defen-
dant owns four-fifths of the blue buses in town, the probabilistic model
would require a verdict against the defendant because the probability
that the defendant is the owner of the bus that hit the plaintiff is 0.8.66
Scholarly debate has failed to produce any satisfactory responses to
these critical examples. The defenders of probability theory generally do
not contend that a verdict for the plaintiff is correct in either case.
Rather than questioning the adequacy of their probabilistic decisionmak-
ing model, however, for the most part they have either tried to demon-
strate that the probability of liability in the examples did not actually
exceed 0.5 or embraced policies other than those of probabilistic deci-
sionmaking to explain the divergence between the verdicts suggested by
the model and those that they concede the legal system ought to reach.
Tribe, for example, suggests that the very fact that the plaintiff in the bus
accident case did not put forth more evidence of ownership of the bus is
itself a fact that effectively lowers the probability that one of the defen-
dant's buses hit the plaintiff67-an explanation with which Kaye
agrees. 68 A similar argument applies to the rodeo case. This argument
loses much of its persuasiveness, however, if such additional evidence is
63 L. Cohen, supra note 7, at 75.
64 Id.
65 Tribe, Trial by Mathematics, supra note 47, at 1340-41, 1346-50.
66 Id. at 1346-48. Tribe argues that this result is inconsistent with the likely real world
outcome, in which, without some evidence specifically tying the defendant to the accident, the
factfinder probably would fail to find liability. Tribe also notes that the result would not be
just because the defendant would be found liable not for four-fifths but for all of the unex-
plained accidents involving blue buses. Id. at 1349-50.
67 See id. at 1349.
6S Kaye, Book Review, supra note 33, at 610.
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either unavailable or so difficult to obtain that a party's failure to produce
it is not indicative of the likelihood of the facts at issue. Furthermore,
Tribe's argument could be applied to the defendant's failure to put forth
more evidence as well.
Glanville Williams has suggested that the defendant must win in the
rodeo example because, in addition to the probabilistic burden, our sense
of justice dictates that the plaintiff should not win if he does not present
some evidence specifically tying this particular defendant to the act in
question.69 Although this argument has some surface appeal, a closer
examination reveals that its principle is not applicable across a very wide
range. For example, if the uncontested facts were that 999 out of the
1,000 rodeo fans were gatecrashers, it is unlikely that our sense of justice
would require us to deny judgment to the proprietor because there were
no facts other than those overwhelming numbers that tended to show
that an individual defendant was one of the 999, and not the one honest
customer.70
Some theorists have argued that denying judgment to the plaintiff in
the bus hypothetical is necessary in order to encourage litigants to find
and introduce as much evidence as possible.71 If plaintiffs such as the
hypothetical bus victim could prevail merely by introducing generalized
statistical evidence, it is argued, they would have no incentive to develop
the facts more fully.72 Tribe and others find this indicative of the inade-
quacy of probability theory and of the need to account for other values in
the legal system.73
These arguments all represent attempts to support the current prob-
abilistic model and, at the same time, to justify deviations from the re-
sults that it dictates. None of these attempts, however, withstands close
analysis. The arguments must be motivated primarily by a concern with
the need to facilitate factually correct trial verdicts. For example, we
would not require evidence tying the particular defendant to the act in
question unless we believe that this information will more likely result in
an accurate decision. Similarly, why should litigants be encouraged to
69 Williams, The Mathematics of Proof, supra note 33, at 305.
70 Williams himself acknowledges some doubts as to the analytical consistency of this ap-
proach. See id.
71 See, e.g., Kaye, supra note 43, at 39-40; Tribe, Trial by Mathematics, supra note 47, at
1349.
72 See Kaye, supra note 43, at 39 ("the law may exclude mathematical probability calcula-
tions precisely to encourage the production of more individualized and revealing evidence");
Tribe, Trial by Mathematics, supra note 47, at 1349 ("[t]o give less [than compelling] force to
the plaintiff's. . omission [of other factual evidence] would eliminate any incentive for plain-
tiffs to do more than establish the background statistics").
73 See Tribe, Trial by Mathematics, supra note 47, at 1368-77. See also Nesson, supra note
45, at 1359.
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find and produce more evidence, if not to enable the factfinder to deter-
mine the facts more accurately?
If, however, these arguments reflect a concern that probabilistic
methods of proof may lead to inaccurate verdicts, then they are inter-
nally inconsistent. For example, in hypotheticals such as those of the
rodeo gatecrashers or the blue bus, if it already has already been deter-
mined that the probability in question exceeds 0.5, the additional infor-
mation called for by the arguments to assure an accurate verdict is
superfluous under the current probabilistic model of the preponderance
standard, which mandates a finding for the plaintiff when he or she dem-
onstrates that the probability of liability exceeds 0.5. Under that model,
therefore, there is enough information to find for the plaintiff once it is
determined that the probability exceeds 0.5. The assertion that more in-
formation is required before finding liability casts doubt on one or both
of the two premises of the analysis-the assumption that the evidence
already justifies a conclusion that the probability exceeds 0.5, or the view
(which is the basis of the currently accepted model) that the plaintiffs
burden is satisfied whenever it is demonstrated that the probability of the
facts supporting liability exceeds 0.5.
This Article contends that the difficulties encountered by the propo-
nents of the current model in responding to examples such as the gate-
crasher and bus cases do not spring from the presence of nonprobabilistic
values in the system, such as the need for individualized evidence or the
desire to encourage more thorough presentations. Instead, these difficul-
ties result from a misleading probabilistic formulation of the burden of
persuasion that is based upon an implicit, and incorrect, assumption con-
cerning the nature of forensically determined probabilities.
B. A More Accurate Theoretical Framework
In the hypothetical situations posited by Cohen and Tribe, the
amount of information known about the incident in question is only a
small fraction of all of the information that could be known about it. 74
74 If one knew all the possible information concerning an event, it would be meaningless to
speak of probabilities. As Kaplan implicitly has recognized, if one had perfect information
about, say, the placement of a coin on the flipper's thumb, the mass distribution of the coin, air
currents, and the force exerted in flipping the coin, one could predict with certainty whether a
flipped coin would turn up heads or tails and would not need to resort to the use of probabili-
ties. See Kaplan, supra note 19, at 1066. To state that the probability of heads from a particu-
lar flipped coin is 0.5, then, is to concede a certain amount of ignorance.
In the legal context, an analogy can be made to the distinction between circumstantial
evidence and "smoking guns." If the factfinder has incontrovertible evidence that a particular
event occurred-a smoking gun, so to speak-the probability that the event occurred is 1.0. In
the absence of a smoking gun, however, we are left with circumstantial evidence from which
only probabilistic judgments can be made.
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In other words, the estimated probability of the defendant's liability is
based upon only a small amount of data.
This observation illuminates a point that has not been addressed in
expositions of probabilistic analysis of proof-that a subjective prob-
ability derived by a legal factfinder is more accurately described as an
"estimate" based on a small portion, or a "sample," of information
rather than as a true value derived from an analysis of all possible infor-
mation.75 Thus, in the language of statisticians, a subjective probability
determined by a legal factfinder is a point estimate7 6 rather than a
parameter. 77
Treating subjective forensic probabilities as point estimates derived
from partial information rather than as true values more accurately re-
flects their nature. As with point estimates, the precision of a subjective
probability derived in the legal context is a function of the quantity of
information upon which it is based. Treating a subjective legal
probability as a sample statistic requires the user to take into account
information about the sample size in determining the precision of the
estimate and to use that knowledge, along with the point estimate, in
making legal decisions.
A nonlegal example will illustrate these principles. Assume that we
must determine the likelihood that the next marble drawn from an ex-
tremely large vat of black and white marbles will be white, given only the
information that out of Y marbles randomly drawn from the vat in the
past, X were white. If fifty prior drawings had produced thirty white
marbles, our best guess for the probability of the next marble being white
would be 0.6. If 100,000 marbles had been drawn, and had yielded
60,000 white marbles, our best estimate of the probability would again be
0.6. Nonetheless, these two probability assessments are quite different;
although the estimates are identical, our confidence in their accuracy
would differ dramatically due to the difference in the amount of informa-
tion upon which they were based. In the first case, we would not be
surprised if the actual probability of drawing a white marble turned out
to be significantly different from 0.6, whereas in the second case a signifi-
cant deviation from the 0.6 figure would be quite surprising.
This observation is not revolutionary. A professional statistician
75 A few commentators seem to have recognized this point, although they have not incor-
porated it into their analyses. See, e.g., Kaye, supra note 43, at 52; Lempert, Modeling Rele-
vance, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1021, 1032 (1977); Tribe, Trial by Mathematics, supra note 47, at
1353-54. Cf. Finkelstein & Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83 Harv.
L. Rev. 489, 493 (1970); Williams, The Mathematics of Proof, supra note 33, at 307.
76 A point estimate is a single estimated figure, or best guess, based on a sampling of the
data. See Wonnacott & Wonnacott, supra note 35, § 7-1.
77 A parameter is a constant figure, often with an unknown value, representing the actual
status of a population. See id.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 60:385
CONFIDENCE IN PROBABILITY
would not have described the two probabilities as identical. Rather, he
or she would be more likely to say that, based on the information pro-
vided in the smaller sample, the probability that the next marble chosen
will be white is ninety-five percent certain 78 to be 0.6 plus or minus 0.14
(that is, between 0.46 and 0.74),79 whereas based on the information pro-
vided by the larger sample, the probability is ninety-five percent certain
to be 0.6 plus or minus 0.003 (that is, between 0.597 and 0.603).8o In
making these statements, the statistician is describing "interval esti-
mates," or "confidence intervals, 81 in which it can be said with a speci-
fied level of confidence that the true value lies. Notably, the statistician
could describe the probability of choosing a white marble in the second
case as very likely to be greater than 0.5, but could not do so in the first
case.
Returning to the legal context, using these statistical principles we
can construct a probabilistic legal decisionmaking model, albeit one that
is more complex than that assumed in the current academic writing in
the field. This model recognizes that subjective probability assessments
by a factfinder are more appropriately analogized to probabilities deter-
mined from sample data than to those derived from complete informa-
tion. The model thus takes into account that the factfinder rarely knows
the exact probability of the existence of the event in question and that,
rather, the factfinder only can state that he or she is certain, to some
degree, that the true probability is within a particular interval, with that
interval becoming wider as the degree of certainty required of the
factfinder increases. The probabilistic standard for factfinding, therefore,
should be described as having a second component. Not only must
factfinders determine that their best estimate of the probability in ques-
tion exceeds the threshold level--O.5 for the preponderance of the evi-
dence standard-based on the evidence presented, but they also must
have a certain level of confidence that the true probability, based on all
possible evidence, exceeds that threshold.
This view of probability theory as applied to legal proof can be illu-
minated by returning to nonlegal examples. In the case of the marbles,
for example, even though in both examples the estimated probability of
choosing a white marble as determined from the available evidence is 0.6,
78 The level of confidence required in any particular situation may be set by the party
involved, but it is typically, although arbitrarily, set at 95%. See, e.g., R. Winkler & W. Hays,
Statistics: Probability, Inference, and Decision 402-03 (2d ed. 1975); Wonnacott & Won-
nacott, supra note 35, § 8-1, at 200.
79 See method for determining confidence intervals using moderately large samples de-
scribed in id. § 8.4, at 224.
8o See method for determining confidence intervals using large samples described in id.
§ 8.4, at 223.
81 See id.
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only in the second example can one state with a high degree of confidence
that the probability of getting a white marble actually is greater than
0.5.82 If, therefore, the ultimate fact to be proved in a civil trial were
whether the next marble chosen will be white, the factfinder could feel
that, although the best guess as to the probability of a white marble in
both hypothetical cases was 0.6, only in the second case would he or she
be confident enough about that guess to find the burden of persuasion
satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence.
A number of critical implications concerning the law of proof follow
from the application of this concept to the factfinder's determination of
liability. First, and most important, it must be recognized that a point
estimate, which is an observer's best single estimate of a value such as the
probability of liability, 83 conveys much less information than an interval
estimate. An interval estimate goes beyond the "best guess" provided by
the point estimate. It tells us how precise that guess is by describing a
range of values within which one has a particular level of confidence that
the true value lies. The point estimate, which does not indicate its preci-
sion, gives the user who is not aware of its nature a false sense of exacti-
tude. This ersatz precision can be quite misleading.
A further example illustrates the value of the information conveyed
by interval estimates that is not supplied by simple point estimates. Sup-
pose that you are asked to determine whether any of three coins is fair 84
based on the following data: Coin A turned up heads 26,000 times in
50,000 flips; coin B turned up heads 27 times in 50 flips; and coin C
turned up heads 51 times in 100 flips. Your best guesses, or point esti-
mates, of the probabilities of heads for coins A, B, and C are 0.52, 0.54,
and 0.51, respectively.8 5 From the point estimates, it might appear that
none of the three coins is fair. However, the point estimates are not nec-
essarily the same as true probabilities. Indeed, the best we can say is that
we are confident that the probabilities are somewhat near the point esti-
mates. More particularly, using the data to develop interval estimates at
the ninety-five percent confidence level, 86 the probability of heads for
coin A is 0.52 plus or minus 0.004; for coin B, 0.54 plus or minus 0.14;
and for coin C, 0.51 plus or minus 0.098. The corresponding interval
estimate for coin A, therefore, is from 0.516 to 0.524; for coin B it is
from 0.40 to 0.68; and for coin C it is from 0.412 to 0.608.
82 At the 95% confidence level, only values below 0.46 can be excluded as the probability
of a white marble appearing in the first example. See text accompanying notes 78-79 supra.
83 Wonnacott & Wonnacott, supra note 35, § 20-4, at 573.
84 One would expect a fair coin to turn up heads in 50% of the flips. Therefore, the
probability of heads for a fair coin is 0.5.
85 See note 76 and accompanying text supra.
86 See note 78 supra.
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When we examine these interval estimates, we see that the only coin
that we can state with confidence is not fair is coin A. Because the inter-
val estimates for the other two coins straddle 0.5, we cannot confidently
exclude 0.5 as a possible true probability of heads for each of those coins.
This example also illustrates an important point about interval esti-
mates. At any particular confidence level, the interval gets smaller as the
quantity of data from which the estimate was derived increases. In the
example of the three coins, for instance, the confidence interval for coin
A, for which 50,000 items of information were available, was plus or mi-
nus 0.004 from the point estimate. The confidence interval for coin B, on
the other hand, for which there was information about only fifty flips,
was much larger-plus or minus 0.14 from the point estimate.
Although the concept of the point estimate as the single best esti-
mate of probability is easily grasped at the intuitive level, quantifying the
precision of that estimate by using confidence intervals is conceptually
more difficult. Recognizing the existence of a confidence interval con-
cedes a certain amount of ignorance as to the true value of the parameter
in question; it is admitting that the true value is not necessarily equal to
the point estimate, but is likely to be "in the neighborhood." That
"neighborhood" is the confidence interval, and the stipulated level of
confidence determines its size. For example, a ninety-five percent confi-
dence interval87 surrounding a point estimate describes a region in which
we believe the true value will fall ninety-five percent of the time.
In the statistician's ideal world of normal distributions and random
samples, the concept of confidence intervals can be demonstrated graphi-
cally. Figure 1 illustrates how the confidence interval for the probability
of heads for coin C was determined.
87 See id.
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FIGURE 1
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Probability of Heads
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The curve is a "probability curve," indicating the probability of vari-
ous possible true values for the probability of heads for coin C. The total
area under the curve, representing the total of all the probabilities of the
various possible true values, equals one. The ninety-five percent confi-
dence interval for our estimate of the probability was determined by
"cutting off," on each end of the probability curve, a region (or "tail")
containing two and one-half percent of the total area under the curve.
Because two such tails were cut off, the remaining region contains ninety-
five percent of the area under the curve, and therefore represents the
region in which the true value will fall ninety-five percent of the time.
The confidence interval consists of the probabilities between the tails-in
this case, all probabilities between 0.412 and 0.608. Eliminating the
highest and lowest extremes excludes from the interval estimates
probabilities that are furthest from the point estimate on either side.
In situations in which one is concerned to avoid errors on only one
side of the point estimate-for example, when one seeks to establish that
a given probability is over a certain threshold but does not care by how
much it is over that threshold-calculation of the interval estimate can
be further refined. The problem posed by legal proof exemplifies such a
situation. The important question in a civil trial is whether the
probability of the facts supporting liability exceeds the threshold
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amount-how much that probability exceeds the threshold is of no im-
portance. Under the preponderance of the evidence standard, so long as
the probability exceeds 0.5, the defendant will be held liable.
In these types of cases, a more appropriate ninety-five percent confi-
dence interval may be constructed by cutting the entire five percent from
one tail-here the bottom tail-of the probability curve. Such an inter-
val estimate is commonly referred to as a "one-tailed" estimate,8 8 in con-
trast to the "two-tailed" intervals described earlier. Figure 2 illustrates a
one-tailed interval estimate, at the ninety-five percent confidence level, of
the probability of heads for coin C:89
FIGURE 2
Probability of Heads
Confidence Interval
A number of important observations concerning probabilities deter-
mined by legal factfinders follow from this analysis. First, such determi-
nations are more appropriately treated as sample statistics rather than as
true values derived from all possible information. Second, to the extent
that factfinders assign a single number to these probability determina-
tions, the determinations are point estimates. As point estimates, they
provide only part of the important information that is known about the
88 Wonnacott & Wonnacott, supra note 35, at § 8-5, at 231.
89 Notice that, by using the one-tailed test, we have raised the bottom of the interval to
0.428.
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likelihood of the issue in question; they represent the factfinder's best
guess as to the probability but tell us nothing about the factfinder's confi-
dence in the accuracy of that guess. Knowledge of the confidence inter-
val surrounding the point estimate-at whatever level of confidence is
appropriate9 °-gives us more information about the true probability. Fi-
nally, as the amount of information used by the factfinder in deriving the
point estimate increases, the confidence interval becomes narrower.
These observations lead to the conclusion, upon which the proposed
model is based, that we can be confident that the probability of the fact at
issue is greater than 0.5 only if the entire interval estimate exceeds that
value. Although this observation flows logically from the preceding
points, it is a significant change in the customary description of the proof
process. Both commentators and courts have tended to assume that
factfinders can determine the true values of the probabilities at issue in a
case, and typically have described the burden of persuasion in civil cases
as the burden of demonstrating that the probability of the existence of
the ultimate issue exceeds 0.5.91 Having only sample information avail-
able, however, a factfinder can never determine the true probabilities
with absolute precision. The most that a factfinder can do is state that he
or she has a particular level of confidence that the probability exceeds
0.5.
C. Application of the Model to the Proof Process
Defining the burden of persuasion as the task of demonstrating that
the entire interval estimate of the probability of the event in question,
rather than merely the point estimate, lies in the region greater than 0.5
complicates the determination of whether the burden has been satisfied.
The plaintiff still must convince the factfinder that his or her best guess
of the true probability is greater than 0.5. In addition, however, the
factfinder must now be convinced that this determination would likely
recur if all possible information were presented at trial, or if another
fairly selected subset of information were taken.
The coin flipping examples presented earlier 92 demonstrate this
point. Our best guess of the probability of heads for coin B, which
turned up heads twenty-seven times in fifty tosses, is 0.54, yet we are not
90 See note 78 supra.
91 See, e.g., United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 403-04 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), 603 F.2d
1053 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980); United States v. Schipani, 289 F. Supp.
43, 55-56 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 414 F.2d 1262 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922
(1970). See also text accompanying notes 60-61 supra. But see M. Finkelstein, supra note 2, at
59-78 (arguing that the equalization of errors between parties may require a higher probability
threshold-i.e., more than 0.5-than does the minimization of errors).
92 See text accompanying notes 84-87 supra.
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confident that if we tossed this coin an infinite number of times the pro-
portion of heads would in fact exceed 0.5. With respect to coin A, on the
other hand, although our point estimate of the probability of heads was
only 0.52-closer to 0.5 than that of coin B-we are confident that if we
flipped coin A an infinite number of times the proportion of heads would
exceed 0.5. This confidence is the result of the large number of flips
made.93 Thus, if a litigant bore the burden of persuading a factfinder that
each coin was unfair, that burden would be met only for coin A.
Although the point estimate of the probability of heads for coin B is
higher, a factfinder could not be confident that the true probability is
indeed greater than 0.5.
A more realistic example illustrates this point in a legal context.
Suppose that Hacker, an electronic hobbyist, contracted to purchase
from High-Tech Supply Company, a mail order firm specializing in elec-
tronic supplies, one Z99 silicon chip for two hundred dollars, F.O.B.
High-Tech's warehouse. 94 Within a reasonable time, High-Tech ten-
dered to a carrier a package addressed to Hacker containing a Z99 chip.
Unfortunately, through no fault of any party, the package was lost in
transit. Nevertheless, High-Tech, thankful that its attorney had recom-
mended that all mail-order contracts of the company be F.O.B. High-
Tech, sent a bill to Hacker for the chip. Not surprisingly, Hacker re-
fused to pay for the chip that she had never received. High-Tech, insen-
sitive to consumer goodwill, filed suit against Hacker for two hundred
dollars.95
In her answer, Hacker admitted the existence of the contract but
denied knowledge as to whether the chip was merchantable. 96 She fur-
ther stipulated that the chip had, in fact, been tendered to the carrier.
Therefore, the only factual issue to be resolved at trial was whether the
chip was merchantable.
At trial, High-Tech presented testimony concerning its acquisition
of the Z99 chips. High-Tech did not manufacture Z99 chips; its entire
supply consisted of one thousand chips that were purchased "as is" at an
auction of the inventory of a bankrupt electronics manufacturer. The
auctioneer admitted that the manufacturer had experienced a serious
quality control problem and that the lot of one thousand chips had not
93 See text accompanying note 87 supra.
94 See U.C.C. § 2-319 (1978).
)5 High-Tech was relying on U.C.C. § 2-509(1)(a) (1978), which transfers the risk of loss in
shipment contracts to the buyer upon delivery of the goods to the carrier, and on id. § 2-
709(l)(a), which enables sellers to recover the price of conforming goods lost or damaged
within a reasonable time after risk of loss has passed to the buyer.
96 Because High-Tech is considered a merchant under the Code, see id. § 2-104(1), the chip
had to have been merchantable to conform to the contract. See id. § 2-314.
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been tested, but he made the chips available for inspection by potential
purchasers.
High-Tech's representative at the auction tested one hundred ran-
domly selected chips and found that fifty-one of the one hundred chips
were in working order and forty-nine were defective. Despite the large
percentage of defective chips in the sample, High-Tech's representative
bid on and purchased the lot. High-Tech did not inspect them further.
The chips were advertised unsuccessfully in High-Tech's catalogue for
several months; indeed, Hacker was the first to order one of the chips.
The chip tendered to the carrier for delivery to Hacker was chosen ran-
domly from the lot, and the following day High-Tech sold the remaining
chips to a scrap dealer who subsequently destroyed them.
Hacker presented no evidence at trial and stipulated to the accuracy
of High-Tech's testimony. Therefore, the sole question for the factfinder
is whether the undisputed facts demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence that the chip intended for Hacker was merchantable. In other
words, the factfinder must assess the probability that the chip in question
was merchantable.
Based on the evidence, our best guess of the probability of
merchantability is 0.51 because fifty-one of the one hundred tested chips
were satisfactory. That guess, however, is only a point estimate. An in-
terval estimate provides additional information. A one-tailed interval
estimate of the probability that the chip was merchantable demonstrates
that, at the ninety-five percent confidence level, we can only say that the
probability exceeds 0.428. 97
In sum, although the factfinder's best estimate of the probability
that the chip was merchantable is greater than 0.5, he or she cannot state
with sufficient confidence-assuming that we adopt the ninety-five per-
cent confidence level-that the probability actually exceeds that number.
Under the current probabilistic model, the point estimate of 0.51 would
dictate that High-Tech should win. If, on the other hand, the burden of
persuasion is defined so as to require the plaintiff to demonstrate that the
entire interval estimate of the probability exceeds 0.5, High-Tech would
lose.
Describing the burden of persuasion in terms of confidence intervals
or interval estimates is more consistent with the way factfinders and
courts intuitively operate98 than is the traditional method, which assumes
knowledge of true values. Furthermore, defining the burden of persua-
sion in this way enables us to explain, in probabilistic terms, cases such as
97 The one-tailed interval estimate has its lowest point at X - Z o5c, and its highest point
at 1.0. See Wonnacott & Wonnaeott, supra note 35, § 8-2, at 210, and § 8-5, at 231.
98 See note 143 infra.
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the gatecrashers and bus company, which are otherwise difficult to recon-
cile with prior concepts of probabilistic proof. In both cases it can easily
be argued that, although the point estimate of the probability of liability
is greater than 0.5, the confidence intervals are so wide that they straddle
0.5. The result is that we cannot say with sufficient confidence that the
true probability of liability exceeds 0.5.
This point is not obvious at first. In both cases, we are given full
population data rather than just samplings. We are given information
about all the spectators at the rodeo and all of the buses in town. Thus,
at least superficially, it appears that the true probability that any random
spectator was a gatecrasher equals 0.501 and that the true probability
that any random blue bus was operated by the Blue Bus Company equals
0.8. However, those probabilities are not at issue. The issue in Cohen's
example is not "What is the probability that a randomly selected specta-
tor at the rodeo was a gatecrasher?" Rather, the question at issue is
"What is the probability that this particular defendant was a gate-
crasher?" Absent from this determination is a great deal of information
beyond the overall proportion of gatecrashers in the rodeo crowd. For
example, does the defendant have a witness who can testify that he or she
saw the defendant purchase a ticket? What is the defendant's reputation
for honesty? Such information would be relevant to any estimate of the
probability that the defendant was a gatecrasher. Indeed, according to
Bayes' Theorem, 99 answers to these questions could be combined with
the information we already have about the number of gatecrashers to
derive a modified, or "posterior," probability of the defendant's liability.
That these questions are unanswered creates our uncertainty. Tribe and
Kaye came close to articulating this point when they suggested that the
plaintiff's failure to produce more evidence amounted to evidence against
the plaintiff.100 However, their observation is unsatisfactory because the
same could be said about the defendants, who also failed to produce evi-
dence. It is more accurate to say that the failure of both parties to pro-
duce more evidence gives rise to a large degree of uncertainty. We
realize that there are many more relevant but unknown facts about the
incident in question, but we do not know which side they favor-that is,
we do not know if they would increase or decrease our probability esti-
mate. What we do know is that additional information would result in a
more precise estimate.
Once again, our analogy to coin flips is illustrative. If we flip a coin
about which we know nothing two or three times with heads resulting
each time, our best guess of the probability of heads for that coin will
99 See note 35 supra.
100 See text accompanying notes 67-68 supra.
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exceed 0.5. Yet no one would confidently state that the probability of
heads for that coin actually does exceed 0.5. Why? Because we are intui-
tively aware that even a fair coin occasionally will produce the same re-
sult the first two or three times it is tossed. Before being able to state
anything about the coin with confidence, we would want to know more
information. The missing information, which could either confirm that
the coin is unfair or suggest that it is indeed fair, is the source of the
uncertainty.
Similarly, in the case of the rodeo gatecrasher,101 we know that
missing information about the defendant and the incident could alter
substantially our probability estimate. Returning to statistical terminol-
ogy, although our point estimate of the probability that a randomly se-
lected defendant was a gatecrasher is 0.501, our interval estimate of that
probability straddles 0.5. Accordingly, we are unable to state with confi-
dence that the probability that this particular defendant is a gatecrasher
exceeds 0.5. Thus, with the burden of persuasion defined as the task of
demonstrating that the interval estimate of the probability of the defen-
dant's liability lies entirely in the region above 0.5, the plaintiff rodeo
proprietor will lose its case against the spectator, just as Professor Cohen
believes it should.
Professor Tribe's bus case'0 2 can be explained similarly. Again,
although our point estimate based on the available evidence is 0.8, there
is so much missing evidence that is relevant to the probability of the bus
company's liability that here, too, the confidence interval could straddle
0.5.103 Therefore, the quantum of proof necessary to prevail according to
the model presented in this Article could again yield a verdict against the
plaintiff, consistent both with Tribe's suggestion and with the likely re-
sult in court.
Note that the proposed model allows us to use insights about confi-
dence intervals even when the evidence does not allow the size of the
interval to be quantified, as is typically the case. The model therefore
serves a heuristic role by illuminating how factfinders apply probabilty
theory in actuality and by demonstrating the effect of limited amounts of
information upon the factfinding process. With respect to the rodeo
gatecrasher and blue bus cases, for example, even though we cannot de-
termine the exact width of the confidence intervals in question, we can
conclude that they are wide enough to straddle 0.5. Thus, this model
101 See text accompanying notes 63-64 supra.
102 See text accompanying notes 65-68 supra.
103 Examples of the missing information might include the safety records of the company
and its competitors, information as to whether the company operated buses on the road or
street where plaintiff was injured, and testimony from the drivers on duty that night.
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explains why a factfinder would reach a result different from the one
suggested by the traditional model, which uses only the point estimate.
D. Ascertaining the Proper Level of Confidence
1. The Relationship Between Level of Confidence and
the Risk of Errors
The essential difference between the model of probabilistic proof
proposed in this Article and previous models is the distinction this model
recognizes between point estimates and interval estimates. Both models
define the burden of persuasion, in cases governed by the preponderance
of the evidence standard, as the requirement of convincing the factfinder
that the probability of the defendant's liability exceeds 0.5. The new
model, however, recognizes that a factfinder cannot determine the
probability exactly but instead can only estimate it with a certain degree
of confidence. Accordingly, this model reformulates the burden of per-
suasion as that of demonstrating that it can be stated with a particular
level of confidence that the probability in question is greater than 0.5.
The level of confidence chosen will determine the width of the interval
surrounding the point estimate of probability. 1 4 The prior model, on the
other hand, operates as though the factfinder can determine the true
probability of defendant's liability. In other words, the prior model as-
sumes that the factfinder is one hundred percent confident of his or her
probability estimate, with a confidence interval of zero width surround-
ing the estimate.
Although the prior model's assumption makes that model easier to
understand, it also makes the model highly unrealistic in the real world
of incomplete knowledge, because the width of the interval estimate nec-
essarily increases with the level of confidence demanded. 0 5 A confidence
level of one hundred percent would result in an interval estimate so wide
that even the most trivial probabilities would not be excluded.10 6 Con-
versely, an interval estimate coterminous with the point estimate would
104 See text accompanying notes 74-81 supra. See also Wonnacott & Wonnacott, supra note
35, § 8-1(a), at 200
105 See authorities cited in note 104 supra. See also Wonnacott & Wonnacott, supra note
35, § 9-4(a), at 260.
106 An interval estimate representing 100% confidence will foreclose only impossible re-
sults. For example, if a coin which has been flipped a number of times with both heads and
tails resulting, the interval estimate, at the 100% confidence level, for the probability of heads
will exclude only 1.0 (because some tails have occurred) and 0.0 (because some heads have
occurred). However, even if the coin had been flipped hundreds or even thousands of times
with heads being the only result, the 100% confidence interval would not exclude the possibil-
ity, however remote, that tails might occur in the future.
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have an infinitesimally small confidence level. 10 7
The difficult, but critical, question presented by the new model is
ascertaining the level of confidence that the legal system should require
in constructing the interval estimates used in the preponderance of the
evidence test. Because any level of confidence involves a risk of error,
choosing the appropriate confidence level requires consideration of both
the possibility of errors and the costs we place on them.
Two possible errors may result from a decision based on sample in-
formation: a party who should not be found liable may be found liable (a
"false inculpation"), and a party who should be found liable may be
found not liable (a "false exculpation"). 10 8 Statisticians have labeled
false inculpation as "Type I error" and false exculpation as "Type II
error." 109
When we express a particular level of confidence in a probabilistic
determination, we are making a statement about the risk of Type I (false
inculpation) error associated with that determination. The relationship
between the two concepts is direct: the risk of Type I error, usually rep-
resented by the Greek letter a,110 is equal to one minus the confidence
level. Thus,
cc = 1 - confidence level
and
confidence level = 1 - c. 1
Choosing a confidence level of ninety-five percent is thus the equivalent
of accepting a five percent risk of Type I error. If the preponderance of
the evidence standard is defined as the burden of demonstrating that the
interval estimate of the probability of defendant's liability at a ninety-five
107 Because the confidence level is equal to the fraction of the area under the probability
curve that is contained in the confidence interval, it can be mathematically described as:
C = faP(x)dx
Clearly, lim C = 0
a-b
108 In other words, a defendant whose probability of liability is equal to or less than 0.5 may
nonetheless be found liable, and vice versa. See Wonnacott & Wonnacott, supra note 35, § 9-
4(a), at 259.
109 Id. The risk of Type I error, usually represented by the symbol a, is defined more
generally in hypothesis testing, see note 117 infra, as the error of rejecting the null hypothesis
when it is true. The risk of Type II error, usually represented by the symbol (3, is the risk of
accepting the null hypothesis when it is false. Id.; H. Blalock, Social Statistics 113-14 (2d ed.
1972).
In the legal context, the null hypothesis is that the defendant is not guilty or not liable. If,
at the chosen level of confidence, the factfinder determines that the defendant is liable (rejects
the null hypothesis) when in fact the defendant should not be held liable, a Type I error has
been made. Conversely, if the factfinder determines that a defendant is not liable (accepts the
null hypothesis) when he should in fact be held liable, a Type II error has occurred.
110 Wonnacott & Wonnacott, supra note 35, § 9-3(c), at 255-56.
II Id.
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percent confidence level lies entirely in the region greater than 0.5, then
that standard incorporates a five percent risk that a defendant for whom
the actual probability of liability is less than 0.5 will lose nonetheless. In
other words, at the ninety-five percent confidence level, five percent of all
defendants who would win if their true probability of liability were
known will incorrectly lose.
The relationship between the risk of Type I error and the risk of
Type II error, and hence between the confidence level and Type II error,
is not easily ascertainable.1 12 Although the two risks are inversely re-
lated in that increasing one decreases the other,113 they are not simple
complements-that is, they do not add up to one. Indeed, in situations
in which the parameter being estimated can take on a full range of values
having an unknown distribution, such as the probability of a defendant's
liability or guilt, the exact risk of Type II error cannot be determined
directly. 114
It is possible to approximate the risk of Type II error, however, by
making assumptions about the distribution of the true probabilities and
constructing models based on these assumptions.1 15 Using such meth-
ods, one statistician, for example, has created a model of an employment
discrimination case in which setting the risk of Type I error at five per-
cent (and thus the confidence level at ninety-five percent) resulted in a
risk of Type II error equal to approximately fifty percent.116
112 See Kaye, Statistical Significance and the Burden of Persuasion, 46 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 13, 22 (Autumn 1983) (citing M. DeGroot, Probability and Statistics 373-82 (1975)).
113 It is easy to see, for any given quantity of data, that a rule of decision that decreases the
likelihood of Type I (false inculpation) errors will increase the likelihood of Type II (false
exculpation) errors, and vice versa. At the extremes, for example, a rule dictating that all
defendants be found liable would have a risk of Type II error equal to 0 but would also have a
very high risk of Type I error. Conversely, a rule dictating that defendants never be found
liable would have a risk of Type I error equal to 0 but a high risk of Type II error. If all
defendants were found liable, there could be no situations of mistaken exculpation. Similarly,
if no defendant were ever found liable, false inculpation could never occur. Wonnacott &
Wonnacott, supra note 35, § 9-4(b), at 260.
114 Wonnacott & Wonnacott, supra note 35, § 9-5, at 263. Because 13 varies with the true
probability, the risk of Type II error in a test cannot be quantified unless we know something
about the distribution of true probabilities. Id. at 264-67. We can, however, assume a set of
true values of the probability in the liability range and then for each such value calculate the
corresponding value of 03, the risk that the confidence level chosen will result in an incorrect
exculpation. By subtracting these results from 1.0, one can calculate for each possible
probability in the liability range the probability that the defendant correctly will be found
liable. The set of these probabilities of correct inculpations usually is referred to as the "power
function" of a test, and a graph of the function often is called a "power curve."
115 See H. Blalock, supra note 109, at 244-49; Dawson, Probabilities and Prejudice in Estab-
lishing Statistical Inferences, 13 Jurimetrics J. 191, 201-09 (1973) (approximating 03 for analo-
gous chi-square sample testing method).
116 See Dawson, Investigation of Fact-The Role of the Statistician, 11 Forum 896, 907-08
(1976).
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It is conventional in both the physical and the social sciences to use
the ninety-five percent confidence level in hypothesis testing 17 and in
constructing confidence intervals.1 8 This convention reflects nothing
more than an arbitrary balancing of the disutilities, or "regrets," 119 of
Type I and Type II errors.1 20 It represents a value judgment within the
context of those types of research as to the relative costs of incorrectly
proclaiming a result on one hand and incorrectly deeming a result not to
have been demonstrated on the other.121 Researchers in these areas have
chosen to accept a relatively high risk of Type II error (that of failing to
reject the null hypothesis, and, therefore, of not accepting a proposition
that is in fact true) in order to minimize the risk of Type I error (that of
incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis, and, therefore, of accepting a
false proposition). Although this conservative balancing of risks may be
appropriate for deciding when to accept a scientific hypothesis, it is not
necessarily appropriate within the legal context. Before accepting this or
any other convention for the legal standard of proof, its balancing of the
risks of Type I and Type II error-and, therefore, the relative disutilities
or regrets implicitly assigned to them-must be examined to determine if
that balancing reflects appropriate social judgments in the context of civil
litigation.
Unfortunately, the legal system generally has applied, without criti-
cal analysis, the conventional but arbitrary test for scientific hypotheses
to factual propositions based on empirical data in civil lawsuits. For ex-
117 Readers familiar with statistical methods may have observed that the description of the
burden of persuasion in terms of confidence intervals is related to the statistical technique
known as "hypothesis testing." See Wonnacott & Wonnacott, supra note 35, § 9-6, at 271-72.
Indeed, the two techniques are equivalent. Id. § 8.2, at 207-12. In hypothesis testing, the
complement of the proposition sought to be established is tentatively assumed, and given the
label "null hypothesis" or "H.." Wonnacott & Wonnacott, supra note 35, § 9-I, at 244-45.
See also note 109 supra. Then, the sample data are compared with a probability distribution of
H.. In classical hypothesis testing, a confidence level-again, typically 95%-is subtracted
from 1.0 to define an "acceptance level." If the likelihood of achieving the sample data given
the null hypothesis is less than the acceptance level, the null hypothesis is deemed "disproved"
at that level and the "alternative hypothesis"-that is, the hypothesis that the null hypothesis
is false-is accepted. Id. § 9-3, at 252-56. Just as with interval estimates, there are "one-
tailed" and "two-tailed" hypothesis tests. Id. § 9-6, at 269-71. In the context of legal proof
subject to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the null hypothesis would be that the
likelihood of the facts supporting liability is less than or equal to 0.5. If that hypothesis is
deemed disproved, the alternative hypothesis-that the probability exceeds 0.5-is accepted.
118 In a two-tailed test, the resulting interval will extend 1.96 standard deviations on either
side of the point estimate. See Wonnacott & Wonnacott, supra note 35, § 9-6(b). This dis-
tance is often rounded to 2.0 standard deviations in constructing the interval estimate. See,
e.g., id. § 8-1, at 200.
119 See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 19, at 1078-79.
120 Wonnacott & Wonnacott, supra note 35, § 94 (discussing Type I and Type II errors in
the context of a criminal trial).
121 See id.; Dawson, supra note 18, at 2.
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ample, in Castaneda v. Partida,122 a case involving alleged discrimination
against Mexican-Americans in jury selection, the Supreme Court stated,
without explanation, that "As a general rule for such large samples, if the
difference between the expected value and the observed number is greater
than two or three standard deviations, then the hypothesis that the jury
drawing was random would be suspect to a social scientist." 123 Simi-
larly, the Supreme Court has adopted, without articulating a justifica-
tion, the methodology of the Castaneda decision in employment
discrimination cases under Title VII. 124
Merely to borrow a standard from the scientific world without ex-
amining the values implicit in such a standard is a mistake. This point
applies not only to proof of discrimination, 25 but to broader issues in
legal proof as well. 126 The Court's lack of analysis of this issue is an
abdication of the responsibility to determine an appropriate allocation of
risks.
2. Choosing the Appropriate Level of Confidence in Civil Litigation
We must recognize that in choosing a confidence level of ninety-five
percent, we are selecting a level which will result in defendants being
found liable in five percent of the situations in which the true probability
of their liability does not exceed 0.5. It also implies that defendants will
be found not liable in perhaps fifty percent of the cases in which the true
probability of their liability is greater than 0.5.127 In other words, the
fraction of defendants who are exonerated but who would be found liable
if the factfinder knew the true probabilities is many times higher than the
fraction of those who are held liable but who would be found innocent if
the factfinder knew the true probabilities. Such a standard assumes that
the social disutility of wrongful inculpation is many times greater than
122 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
123 Id. at 497 n.17. Two standard deviations translates into a confidence level of just over
95%. See note 118 supra.
124 See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 311 n.17 (1977). See also,
e.g., Davis v. City of Dallas, 483 F. Supp. 54, 58 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (finding a "statistically
significant disparity"-6.31 standard deviations-between the expected number of black police
officers and the actual number hired).
125 E.g., Kaye, supra note 112, at 14 n.7.
126 Discrimination cases involve the testing of hypotheses that are different from those ad-
dressed by the model proposed in this Article. In a typical employment discrimination case,
for example, the null hypothesis might be that the hiring decisions of the defendant reflected a
random selection of men and women from the appropriate pool.
127 The 50% figure is based on the approximation of 3 suggested by Dawson, supra note
115. As noted, 13 cannot be determined precisely in situations in which there is an unknown
distribution of possible true probabilities. See Kaye, supra note 112, at 14 n.7. Depending on
the particular case, the value of 13 could be higher or lower. In most situations, however, the
choice of a=0.05 will result in 13 much greater than ca.
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the social disutility of wrongful acquittal. It is certainly not obvious that
any values appropriate in civil litigation justify reaching this particular
balance.
In order to determine a confidence level appropriate for use in con-
structing confidence intervals around probability estimates in civil litiga-
tion, we must examine a range of possible alternatives and their
implications. Although such analyses have been undertaken in the nar-
row context of the hypotheses tested in discrimination litigation, 28 they
have not been extended to civil litigation generally.
One possible solution is to use a confidence level that will minimize
the likelihood that a defendant will lose if the true probability of the facts
establishing his or her liability is less than 0.5. This choice has intuitive
appeal because, if the factfinder had total information, the defendant
would lose only if the probability with respect to the issue at hand ex-
ceeded 0.5. It would appear legitimate to assume that the legal system
should seek to minimize the likelihood that a plaintiff for whom the rele-
vant probability is actually less than 0.5 will be found to have met this
burden. This alternative, however, does not withstand close scrutiny.
The confidence level that most effectively minimizes the likelihood of a
wrongful verdict in favor of a plaintiff is one hundred percent. 129 Such a
high level of confidence would translate, in every case involving a factual
dispute, into a very simple rule of decision: the plaintiff always loses.
Thus, a system that achieves the goal of minimizing wrongful recoveries
by plaintiffs by totally eliminating judgments for the plaintiff whenever
the true (but unknown and unknowable) probability of the defendant's
liability does not exceed 0.5 entails the high cost of producing the maxi-
mum number of incorrect judgments in favor of defendants.13 0
A second possible solution would be to choose a confidence level
that most effectively minimizes the likelihood that a plaintiff will lose
when the true probability in question exceeds 0.5. This alternative is the
opposite of the first proposal, and it suffers from the same flaws. Using
this solution, the rule of decision in all cases involving factual disputes
would be equally simple: the plaintiff always wins.131
A third possibility would be to impose a preponderance test of sorts
on the confidence interval by choosing a confidence level an infinitesimal
amount in excess of fifty percent. At this confidence level, a, the risk of
128 See text accompanying notes 10-19, 122-24 supra.
129 See notes 106-07 and accompanying text supra.
130 This phenomenon follows from the inverse relationship between Type I error and Type
II error. Here, where a, the risk of Type I error, is set at zero, 3, the risk of Type II error, is at
its maximum. See note 113 supra.
131 Although 0, the risk of Type II error, would be zero, a, the risk of Type I error, would
be at its maximum. See note 113 supra.
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Type I error, would be a shade under 0.5, and 03, the risk of Type II
error, would probably be somewhat less. 132 This proposal is also inade-
quate, however. It is one thing to state that a plaintiff should win when-
ever the true (though unknown) probability of the facts in question
exceeds 0.5. It is quite another to state that he or she should win when-
ever it is infinitesimally more likely than not that a defendant for whom
the true probability is less than 0.5 would not reach the point estimate of
probability. Even with total circumstantial information, a rule of deci-
sion that dictates a judgment for the plaintiff when the true probability is,
say, 0.51 implies that we are willing to give the "wrong" verdict forty-
nine percent of the time.133
Setting the confidence level at fifty percent means, of course, ac-
cepting a fifty percent chance of Type I error-that is, an even chance
that a defendant for whom the true probability is 0.5 or less will never-
theless be found liable. Thus, a system that allows a plaintiff to prevail
whenever the evidence supports the inference, at the fifty percent confi-
dence level, that the probability exceeds 0.5 would tolerate not only the
errors that would arise when the true probability was known, but also
would include those arising from mistaken estimates of that probability.
Such a system would give "incorrect" verdicts in favor of the plaintiff in
a high percentage of cases in which the defendant should prevail. Fur-
thermore, inasmuch as 03, the risk of Type II error, would likely be less
than c in these situations,134 we would be making such mistakes propor-
tionately more often against defendants than'against plaintiffs without
any policy justification for the imbalance.
Surprisingly, in the ideal world of normal distributions and random
samples, this alternative would be the functional equivalent of the cur-
rent probabilistic model, which incorrectly assumes that the factfinder
determines the true probability of the defendant's liability. As Figure 3
illustrates, the lowest point in a one-tailed interval estimate at the fifty
percent confidence level is the point estimate:135
132 Although 13 is not directly determinable, see text accompanying notes 112-14 supra, be-
cause a 13 of roughly 0.5 has been shown in a prototypical case to be associated with an a of
0.05, and because there is an inverse relationship between c and 03, the increase in a from 0.05
to 0.5 would cause a reduction in 03 from 0.5. See Dawson, supra note 115.
133 A 0.51 probability that the defendant actually committed the wrongful act is the same as
a 0.49 probability that he did not. See Kaye, Naked Statistical Evidence, supra note 33, at 497.
134 See text accompanying notes 113-14 supra.
135 This is because, in such an ideal world, the probability curve straddles the point estimate
evenly; therefore cutting off the lower 50% would leave only the area to the right of the point
estimate. For a definition of one-tailed intervals, see text accompanying notes 88-89 supra.
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FIGURE 3
Point Estimate
Interval Estimate
Thus, a requirement that this entire interval exceed 0.5 is the same as a
requirement that the point estimate exceed 0.5. The requirement that the
factfinder's point estimate of the probability exceed 0.5 is, of course, the
traditional probabilistic test.
Because the risk of false inculpation (Type I error) in this test is
likely to be greater than the risk of false exculpation (Type II error), the
test, in a sense, favors plaintiffs. Thus the traditional formulation of the
preponderance of the evidence standard reflects an implicit and probably
unintended bias in favor of one of the parties in litigation. This observa-
tion casts additional light on the inability of the traditional model to
solve the problems posed by Cohen and Tribe. Recall that in each of
these hypothetical situations the traditional model yielded a probability
that was greater than 0.5 and therefore mandated a verdict for the plain-
tiff, despite arguments that the plaintiffs would not prevail in the legal
system.136 That problematic result can now be seen to flow from the
assumption that a factfinder's point estimate of liability is the true
probability (and the implicit adoption of the fifty percent confidence
interval).
A fourth possibility would be to choose a confidence level at which
13, rather than a, equals 0.5. Under this test, a defendant who should be
136 See text accompanying notes 63-66 supra.
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found liable would nevertheless have a fifty percent chance of prevailing.
Such a model would have the same faults as the third alternative dis-
cussed except that it would disadvantage plaintiffs disproportionately,
rather than defendants. At present, no policies have been articulated
suggesting that we should prefer either of these alternatives.
A final possible solution would be to choose a confidence interval
such that a equals 3. Defendants would then lose when the true
probability was under 0.5 as often as plaintiffs would lose when the
probability exceeded 0.5. The costs incurred as a result of our inability to
assess true probabilities because of our lack of complete information
would fall evenly on plaintiffs and defendants. This alternative presents a
significant practical difficulty because 13, the risk of Type II error, cannot
be determined directly. 137 To the extent that the new model is used
heuristically rather than mechanically, however, this obstacle is not fatal.
Putting aside the practical difficulty, this fifth proposal is best suited
to further the evenhanded policies underlying civil litigation. 138
Although in practice such a standard would not guarantee a "correct"
result in any individual case, its overall effect would be to equalize the
cost of "wrong" judgments so that the system as a whole would favor
neither plaintiffs nor defendants.1 39 Indeed, Professor Dawson has sug-
gested this approach to assess allegations of discrimination. 140
In sum, choosing the appropriate confidence level for the preponder-
ance standard is not simple. Selecting the level that equalizes the risks of
Type I and Type II errors has conceptual advantages, but this approach
presents serious practical problems arising from our inability to deter-
mine 13 in the absence of information that is usually unavailable. There-
fore, the best that we can do is to estimate the risk of Type II error and
accept the inherent imprecision resulting from the assumptions used to
make such estimates. Nevertheless, to the extent that the model serves a
heuristic rather than a technical function, these problems do not detract
from the model's usefulness.
137 See note 114 and accompanying text supra.
138 See Kaplan, supra note 19, at 1072.
139 Cf. Dawson, supra note 115, at 209 (making the same observation in the context of
proving discrimination).
140 Id. However, neither Dawson nor the other legal statisticians who have done work in
the discrimination area have noted the connection between the rules that they propose for
determining the existence of discrimination and broader questions concerning probabilistic in-
terpretations of the burden of persuasion.
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III
IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW MODEL
A. Allocation of the Burden of Persuasion
The approach that this Article proposes for understanding the pre-
ponderance burden of persuasion in probabilistic terms is essentially a
redefinition of the quantum of evidence that the party bearing the burden
must present in order to prevail. Viewed in this way, the model has im-
portant implications for the allocation of burdens of persuasion among
the parties to litigation. Under the traditional formulation of the prepon-
derance burden, which is described as the burden of demonstrating that
the true probability of the event in question exceeds 0.5,141 the allocation
of the burden would not have very much significance. If that formula-
tion were accurate, the only circumstance in which the allocation would
determine the result of a case would be a situation in which neither party
could meet the burden-that is, when the probability in question equals
exactly 0.5. In such a case, the party bearing the burden of persuasion
would lose. In all other situations, the result would not be affected by the
placement of the burden of persuasion. Because in any case in which any
evidence has been introduced the chance that the probability equals ex-
actly 0.5, and not 0.50001 or 0.49999, is minuscule, the current probabil-
istic formulation of the burden of persuasion implies that allocating that
burden should not be an important task. Yet any student of evidence or
civil procedure knows that courts and litigants rarely consider the bur-
den of persuasion to be a minor issue. Indeed, virtually every area of the
law is replete with cases debating the allocation of the burden of
persuasion. 142
Conceiving of the burden of persuasion as presented in this Article,
on the other hand, sheds light on why burden allocation is taken so seri-
ously. This new model clarifies the practical content within the concept
of equipoise. Situations in equipoise-in which neither party can meet
the burden of persuasion-would include not only situations where the
true probability is exactly 0.5 but also all situations in which the interval
estimate of the probability of the facts supporting liability straddles 0.5.
In any such case, the evidence provided by the parties would be insuffi-
141 See text accompanying note 61 supra.
142 See, e.g., Russell v. Barnes Found., 52 F. Supp. 827 (E.D. Pa. 1943), affid, 143 F.2d 871
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 771 (1944) (anticipatory breach of employment contract);
Crillo v. Curtola, 91 Cal. App. 2d 263, 204 P.2d 941 (1949) (breach of employment contract);
Quillen v. Betts, 48 Del. 93, 98 A.2d 770 (1953) (in motion to recall bail after indictment,
burden placed on defendant to rebut presumption of guilt); Nelson v. Oversmith, 69 Idaho 1,
201 P.2d 747 (1949) (to recover damages, burden on plaintiff to show negligence); Milhollin v.
Adams, 66 Ind. App. 376, 115 N.E. 803 (1917) (wrongful discharge). See also 9 J. Wigmore,
supra note 57, §§ 2485-2489.
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cient to allow the factfinder to state with sufficient confidence that the
probability that the facts support either party's position exceeds 0.5. Ac-
cordingly, in these cases it is important to determine which party will
suffer for that mutual inability. Under the reformulated definition of the
quantum of the burden of persuasion, allocation of the burden deter-
mines who will lose when the factfinder cannot determine with the requi-
site amount of confidence on which side of 0.5 the true probability lies. 143
B. Harmonizing Opinions that Reject Probabilistic Analysis
This new formulation of the burden of persuasion also helps to har-
monize probabilistic legal analysis with judicial opinions previously con-
sidered hostile to the use of such techniques. The case most often cited
for the proposition that a probabilistic interpretation of the preponder-
ance standard is inappropriate is Sargent v. Massachusetts Accident Co. 44
In this opinion, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated:
It has been held not enough that mathematically the chances some-
what favor a proposition to be proved; for example, the fact that
colored automobiles made in the current year outnumber black ones
would not warrant a finding that an undescribed automobile of the
current year is colored and not black, nor would the fact that only a
minority of men die of cancer warrant a finding that a particular man
did not die of cancer. The weight or ponderance of evidence is its
power to convince the tribunal which has the determination of the fact,
of the actual truth of the proposition to be proved. After the evidence
has been weighed, that proposition is proved by a preponderance of the
evidence if it is made to appear more likely or probable in the sense
that actual belief in its truth, derived from the evidence, exists in the
mind or minds of the tribunal notwithstanding any doubts that may
still linger there.145
Five years later the same court relied upon this dictum as the basis for
rejecting statistical evidence in Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc.,146 the case
that inspired Professor Tribe's bus hypothetical.
At first glance, these cases seem squarely to reject explicit probabil-
istic interpretations of the preponderance standard. Indeed, Sargent has
frequently been cited in support of that proposition. 147 Yet a close read-
143 My colleague D. Michael Risinger has long held a similar view. He contends that
factfinders who consider a case to be in equipoise do not in fact believe that they have meas-
ured precisely the relevant probability to be exactly 0.5; rather, their view of the probability
tends to oscillate between values on either side of 0.5 and they cannot confidently fix it on one
side or the other.
144 307 Mass. 246, 29 N.E.2d 825 (1940).
145 Id. at 250, 29 N.E.2d at 827 (citations omitted).
146 317 Mass. 469, 58 N.E.2d 754 (1945).
147 See, e.g., Callen, supra note 33, at 37; Kaye, The Paradox of the Gatecrashers, supra
note 33, at 103-11; Winter, supra note 61, at 338. See also Stepakoffv. Kantar, 393 Mass. 836,
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ing of the Sargent court's statement can support the related, but funda-
mentally different, conclusion that the court actually was rejecting a
particular probabilistic interpretation of the preponderance of the evi-
dence standard that it viewed as mistaken-the one that treats point esti-
mates as true values.
Indeed, much of the court's language is not necessarily inconsistent
with the confidence level interpretation of the preponderance of the evi-
dence standard. In particular, the two examples the Sargent court pro-
vides-the probability that a randomly selected automobile will be
colored or that a man who dies had cancer-resemble the cases of "na-
ked statistical evidence" posited by Cohen and Tribe.148 Once the sam-
ple statistic nature of probability estimates is recognized, the court's
examples easily can be harmonized with probabilistic formulations of the
preponderance standard.
Although the Sargent court's references to the need to persuade the
tribunal of the "actual truth of the proposition to be proved" 149 and the
need for the tribunal to have an "actual belief in its truth"' 50 are much
harder to reconcile with the probabilistic view, these references can be
understood as unfocused attempts to describe the concept of confidence.
Thus, these cases may display judicial hostility more toward a particular
conception of probabilistic proof than to the general appropriateness of
probability in the legal context. The Massachusetts court may have been
expressing, at an intuitive level, a view that is consistent with the ideas
presented in this Article.
C. Implications for Other Burdens of Persuasion
This Article has focused on the burden of persuasion most com-
monly applied in civil lawsuits-the preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard. Nevertheless, the analysis set forth is relevant to other burdens of
persuasion as well. In many civil lawsuits involving fraud or other quasi-
criminal conduct, the burden of persuasion requires the plaintiff to
demonstrate the relevant fact or issue by "clear and convincing evi-
dence." 151 In criminal cases, courts apply the even stricter standard of
"proof beyond a reasonable doubt."' 152
-, 473 N.E.2d 1131, 1136(1985) (judge's charge quoting Sargent language on appeal); King's
Case, 352 Mass. 488, 491-92, 225 N.E.2d 900, 902 (1967) (favorably referring to Sargent).
148 See Kaye, Naked Statistical Evidence, supra note 33, at 487-90. "Naked statistical evi-
dence" refers to cases in which there is only quantitative evidence.
149 307 Mass. at 250, 29 N.E.2d at 827.
150 Id.
151 C. McCormick, supra note 57, § 340, at 959; 9 J. Wigmore, supra note 57, § 2498, at
424-27.
152 C. McCormick, supra note 57, § 341, at 962; 9 J. Wigmore, supra note 57, § 2497, at
404-15.
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Prior theorists have assumed that the probabilistic formulations of
these more stringent burdens differ from the preponderance standard in
requiring that the probability of the facts supporting liability or guilt ex-
ceed a threshold higher than 0.5.153 In the criminal area, much effort has
been expended in debating the precise level of that threshold
probability.154 This Article has demonstrated, however, that there are
two variables in the probabilistic formulation of burdens of persuasion-
the threshold probability and the level of confidence that is used in con-
structing the interval estimate.
Accordingly, the more stringent burdens of persuasion can differ
from the preponderance burden in one or both of two ways. Either the
threshold may be increased (which has been the presumption of current
theories),1 55 or the confidence level may be increased, or both. For exam-
ple, the difference between the clear and convincing standard and the
preponderance of the evidence standard could be that the former has a
higher threshold probability (which is the only possibility in the current
model). The difference, however, also could be that the clear and con-
vincing standard requires the factfinder to use a higher level of confi-
dence in constructing the interval estimate. The burden then would be
described as demonstrating at the new, higher confidence level that the
estimated probability of the facts supporting liability exceeds 0.5. If the
confidence required is increased substantially, even though the 0.5
threshold value remains unchanged, the plaintiff's burden would be sig-
nificantly more difficult to meet. By allowing for the interaction of two
variables, the probabilistic model identified in this Article will enable
more sophisticated analysis of burdens of proof generally.156
CONCLUSION
Current probabilistic models of burdens of proof have encountered
significant difficulty in attempting to account for discrepancies between
the results that they suggest and those that the legal system regularly
reaches. These models suggest that the burden has been met in many
cases in which courts and juries would not so hold-particularly in cases
in which the factfinder has relatively little information. Proponents of
the current probabilistic models have attempted to explain these discrep-
ancies by arguing that they result from the presence of other values
153 See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 19, at 1072.
154 See, e.g., id. at 1073-77.
155 See, e.g., United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 603 F.2d
1053 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980).
156 Furthermore, this author will demonstrate in a forthcoming work how the new model
can illuminate the process by which courts review findings of fact and the standards applied in
such reviews.
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within the legal system that take precedence over probabilistic
factfinding.
This Article contends that these discrepancies are not the result of
external values but rather follow from a fundamental error in the models.
The current theories assume that the legal system can and does deter-
mine the true probabilities of disputed legal facts. They then define the
burden of persuasion as the burden of demonstrating that the probability
of the facts supporting liability exceeds a particular threshold value.
This Article explains that the legal system can only estimate
probabilities. Once it is recognized that forensically determined
probabilities are only estimates, it becomes necessary to develop a new
probabilistic model of the burden of persuasion. The model developed in
the Article requires that, in order to satisfy the preponderance of the
evidence standard, not only must the factfinder's best guess, or point esti-
mate, of the probability of the facts supporting liability exceed 0.5, but
the factfinder also must be confident that the true probability of liability
in fact exceeds 0.5. In statistical terms, the entire interval estimate, or
confidence interval, of the probability must exceed 0.5 at a given confi-
dence level.
This model offers a more accurate, comprehensive concept of foren-
sically determined probabilities than do current models of probability.
By taking into account the role of confidence as well as the factfinder's
"best guess," this new model avoids many of the difficulties encountered
by the previous models and clarifies our understanding of equipoise and
of more stringent burdens of persuasion.
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